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ABSTRACT
This Article delves into the conventional assumptions regarding
the openness (or lack thereof) of China’s markets to overseas
investors, and critically assesses the merits of the new legal
framework for foreign direct investment (“FDI”). It analyzes three
strands of the legal system that affect the flow of overseas capital:
merger control, international investment agreements, and national
FDI regulation. This Article focuses on the interplay between
national and international law, and the traditional assumptions
about China that often infuse Western scholarship. After pointing to
the risks of utilizing merger review rules to address the national
security concerns of FDI operations, this Article discusses how
China’s latest endeavors to expand its shy international
commitments have been indefinitely truncated by rising political
tensions. In an attempt to foster an investor-friendly atmosphere, a
new Foreign Investment Law (“FIL”) has streamlined the domestic
FDI legal framework and removed vital obstacles. This Article argues
that a combination of unfamiliarity with tacit customary rules and
skepticism about the candidness of the improvements could
jeopardize the effectiveness of the reform. Relying on a combination
of doctrinal research methodology and a “law-in-action” approach,
it suggests that the success of the new rules is on both investors and
policymakers, and points to the limitations of resorting to national
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as opposed to international law in the investment liberalization
process.
I. INTRODUCTION
China has become a hot spot for foreign direct investment
(“FDI”).1 By the mid 2000s, there was notable foreign presence in
sectors such as chemicals, medicine, machinery, and electronics.2
In 2020, when FDI flows to the United States and the European
Union experienced a colossal, COVID-induced slump, China saw a
four percent increase, and became the world’s largest FDI recipient
with a total of US$163 billion.3 Upon joining the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”), the government’s policies took a 180degree turn, shifting from discouraging investment of domestic
companies abroad to a more liberal policy that facilitates incoming
and outgoing FDI.4 In the context of the Belt and Road Initiative
(“BRI”),5 China has further vowed to make investments easier by
removing “barriers, and push[ing] forward negotiations on
bilateral investment protection agreements and double taxation
avoidance agreements to protect the lawful rights and interests of
investors.”6 These pledges bore their first fruits in 2019 in a new
Foreign Investment Law (“FIL”) which entered into force in 2020

1. See China Takes New Foreign Investment Top Spot from US, BBC NEWS (Jan. 25,
2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-55791634
[https://perma.cc/75LFVNHE].
2. See TINGTING WEINREICH-ZHAO, CHINESE MERGER CONTROL LAW: AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS
COMPETITION-POLICY ORIENTATION AFTER THE FIRST YEARS OF APPLICATION 11 (2015).
3. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Global FDI Flows Down
TRENDS
MONITOR
1,
2-3
(Jan.
2021)
42%
in
2020,
38,
INV.
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaeiainf2021d1_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2LYR-XEQY]; see also Evelyn Cheng, Foreign Firms Snap Up Chinese
Companies Despite Political Tensions as Beijing Opens Its Doors, CNBC (Jun. 21, 2021)
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/22/investing-in-china-foreign-firms-buy-more-chinadespite-tensions-with-us.html [https://perma.cc/V73J-NKBK].
4. See Jiyong Chen et al., Investment Facilitation and China’s Outward Foreign Direct
Investment Along the Belt and Road, 61 CHINA ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2020) (“Policies toward the
foreign direct investment have become liberal and facilitatory.”).
5. See generally BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE, https://www.beltroad-initiative.com/beltand-road/ [https://perma.cc/YM2X-DMWJ] (last visited Aug. 10, 2021).
6. Nat’l Dev. And Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of
Com. Of China, with State Council Authorization, Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Belt
and Road, BELT AND ROAD F. FOR INT’L COOP. (Apr. 10, 2017),
http://2017.beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2017/0410/c22-45.html
[https://perma.cc/J3UU-9L84].
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and, at least on paper, removed critical hurdles to FDI and provided
greater legal certainty.7
The liberalizing trend of Chinese FDI policy is a testament to
the importance of the free flow of capital to economic growth.
According to the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), crossborder investment “fosters intertemporal optimization of
consumption, helps finance the balance of payments, and promotes
efficient allocation of world savings.”8 Yet, despite the recent
promising events, it is not infrequent to find stories in the press
about China’s hostility toward foreign businesses.9 These
apprehensions are, in part, explained by several outstanding
regulatory constraints, such as the considerable number of sectors
that remain off-limits for non-Chinese companies (particularly in
services markets), and the strict requirements traditionally
applied in some of the areas where investment is allowed.10
Other concerns, however, arise out of investors’ assumptions
of Chinese FDI policies, which appear to stem from two more
abstract, interconnected phenomena. The first relates to the
divergent perceptions of the reality investors are met with upon
venturing into China, such as the claim that foreign businesses are
forced to transfer their technology to local firms, which has been
7. See (中华人民共和国外商投资法) [FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW OF CHINA] (adopted at
the Second Session of the 13th National People’s Congress, Mar. 15, 2019, effective Jan. 1,
2020), translated at Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China, INV. POL’Y HUB
(2019), https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-laws/laws/317/china-foreigninvestment-law-of-the-people-s-republic-of-china
[https://perma.cc/64PD-WE78]
[hereinafter FIL].
8. Matthias Vocke, Investment Implications of Selected WTO Agreements and the
Proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment 4 (IMF Working Paper No. 60, 1997).
9. See, e.g., Lucy Hornby & Tom Mitchell, China Warned About Hostility to Foreign
Business, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 7, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/21d99142-2c5e11e6-a18d-a96ab29e3c95 [https://perma.cc/4JQT-557A]; Wendy Wu, Is China Making
Life Difficult for Foreign Companies?, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 2, 2016),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1940397/chinamaking-life-difficult-foreign-companies [https://perma.cc/NW63-YQPS]; Amitrajeet A.
Batabyal, China Makes It Incredibly Hard for Foreign Businesses to Operate—But They Stay
Because the Money Is Just Too Good, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 19, 2020),
https://theconversation.com/china-makes-it-incredibly-hard-for-foreign-businesses-tooperate-but-they-stay-because-the-money-is-just-too-good-147546
[https://perma.cc/X3AP-BJ9P]; Stanley Chao, The New Reality of Doing Business With
China, INDUS. WK. (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.industryweek.com/theeconomy/trade/article/21159780/the-new-reality-of-doing-business-in-china
[https://perma.cc/8H9V-WJR5].
10. See infra Section IV.A.
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described as one of the “fiercest frictions within US–China trade.”11
Non-Chinese media outlets frequently take it as a given,12 overseas
businesses complain about it,13 and the political elites have been
vocal in their criticisms of a policy considered to be an outlandish
imposition contrary to WTO commitments.14 Yet, it remains a
disputed assertion,15 and arguably has never been a legal
requirement.16 Accordingly, in the eyes of China, technology
transfer is a voluntary commitment that would be undertaken in
one’s own interest to access highly lucrative markets.17
The second issue is the deep-rooted mutual mistrust
prevalent among certain Chinese and Western circles, which
translates into skepticism of ostensibly positive developments. For
example, in the context of a discussion of a prospective investment
agreement between China and the European Union, critics pointed
11. See Jyh-An Lee, Forced Technology Transfer in the Case of China, 26 B.U. J. OF SCI. &
TECH. L. 324, 326 (2020).
12. See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, A Temporary US–China Trade Truce Starts to Look
Durable, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/27/business/uschina-trade-deal.html [https://perma.cc/JB5L-VWB7] (claiming that one success of the on
US-China Phase One Agreement (see infra Section II.C.1.) was that ‘China stop[ped] forcing
foreign companies to transfer technology to Chinese firms as a condition of doing business
there’); Chad P. Brown, Anatomy of a Flop: Why Trump’s US-China Phase One Trade Deal
Fell Short, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON.: TRADE AND INV. POL’Y WATCH (Feb. 8, 2021),
https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/anatomy-flop-whytrumps-us-china-phase-one-trade-deal-fell [https://perma.cc/A5ZQ-WSK4] (referring to
‘the forced, insufficiently compensated, transfer of American technology’).
13. See, e.g., 2020 Member Survey, US–CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL 1, 13 (2020),
https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/uscbc_member_survey_2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7M8N-EAD7].
14. See inter alia Request for Consultations by the European Union, China – Certain
Measures on the Transfer of Technology, WTO Doc. WT/DS549/6 (June 1,2018),
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/december/tradoc_157591.12.20%20%20REV%20consultation%20request%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/27AJ-C6EP]; Off.
of the U.S. Trade Representative, Exec. Off. Of The President, Findings of the Investigation
Into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual
Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF
[https://perma.cc/Z9SS-D3NP]; see also Jessica Brum, Technology Transfer and China’s
WTO Commitments, 50 GEO. J. OF INT’L L. 709, 710-11 (2019).
15. See, e.g., WEIHUAN ZHOU, CHINA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULINGS OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION 136–138 (2019).
16. See infra Part III.
17. See Daniel Gros, The Myth of China’s Forced Technology Transfer, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (Nov. 8, 2018) https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/myth-offorced-technology-transfer-china-by-daniel-gros-2018-11
[https://perma.cc/HZ3QCEQ2].
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out that any gains for the latter “will likely pale in comparison to
the promises that go unfulfilled and the strategic advantage Europe
has ceded.”18 And when asked about China’s supply-side structural
reforms,19 the President of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China,
Jörg Wuttke, replied that he saw “some good news” but was afraid
it was “only rhetoric.”20 Economist Thomas Piketty has made the
point forcefully by highlighting the urgency of “ending Western
arrogance and promoting a new emancipatory and egalitarian
horizon on a global scale,” and insisting that if Western countries
“stick to their usual lecturing posture and dated hyper-capitalist
model, [they] may find it extremely difficult to meet the Chinese
challenge.”21 Regardless of the accuracy of Piketty’s claims, it is not
uncommon to encounter strong opinions on developments in
China that are tinted with instinctive disapproval, without taking
the time to consider possible root causes or contextual differences
that may offer an explanation.
Scientifically assessing the accuracy and magnitude of these
off-the-record developments is an intricate endeavor. If those
findings hold true, on paper China may outwardly be rolling out the
red carpet for foreign investors, but in practice tacit policies could
continue to complicate operations that should, in theory, be
smooth sailing.22 It is evident that any business wanting to enter an
overseas market needs to become acquainted with customary
practices that will, to a great extent, determine the success of its
presence abroad.23 Ultimately, this is not a China-specific issue, but

18. Dr. James Carafano et al., The Pitfalls of the China-EU Comprehensive Agreement
on Investment, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 22, 2021), https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/thepitfalls-of-the-china-eu-comprehensive-agreement-on-investment/
[https://perma.cc/S6GV-L5BR].
19. See, e.g., CAI FANG, CHINA’S NEW NORMAL, SUPPLY-SIDE, AND STRUCTURAL REFORM
(forthcoming Nov. 2021); LIN XIAO, NEW SUPPLY SIDE ECONOMICS: THE STRUCTURAL REFORM ON
SUPPLY SIDE AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH (2017).
20. Hornby & Mitchell, supra note 9.
21. Thomas Piketty, Responding to Chinese Challenge with Democratic Socialism, LE
MONDE (Jul. 13, 2021), https://www.lemonde.fr/blog/piketty/2021/07/13/respondingto-chinese-challenge-with-democratic-socialism/ [https://perma.cc/4QJH-QT7H].
22. See generally supra note 9.
23. See, e.g., Gabrielle Appleby, Unwritten Rules, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION (Cheryl Saunders & Adrienne Stone eds., 2018) (discussing the
power of unwritten rules); Bruce A Markell, Lawyers, Judges and Unwritten Rules, 36 EMORY
BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL 719 (2020); Lawrence R. Helfer & Ingrid B. Wuerth,
Customary International Law: An Instrument Choice Perspective, 37 MICH. J. OF INT’L L. 563
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in light of the colossal disparities that exist between Western and
Chinese legal and business traditions, FDI experiences might turn
into an uphill struggle without insider knowledge. This could be
particularly acute given the volume of unpublished rules in
Chinese culture. As Peter Howard Corne, an expert in Chinese
corporate and regulatory practice, has explained, historically
“[c]ustomary law represented the primary set of norms” applying
to everyday activities, and “[f]ormal laws rarely intruded into the
daily lives of the people.”24 Despite the legal reforms of the
twentieth century which codified the legal system, the supremacy
of customary law in business and even family relationships
remains unchallenged.25
This article examines the conventional assumptions
regarding the accessibility of China’s markets to overseas
investors, and critically assesses the merits of the updated
“internationalized” FDI legal landscape. To this end, it relies on a
combination of doctrinal research methodology and a “law-inaction” pragmatic approach. It explores the full spectrum of
legislation that may be used to exert control over foreign
investment, namely merger control provisions, international
investment agreements (“IIAs”), and national FDI-specific
regulation. Part I considers the application of merger control
provisions to FDI. Part II delves into China’s international
investment commitments, while Part III reflects on China’s new
FIL. Part IV assesses the rules. This Article argues that the new
policy is, theoretically, consistent with international practice; how
China is regulated by Western nations directly impacts how China
regulates those nations.26 While generally surmountable, practical
hurdles need to be tackled head-on by both would-be investors and
policymakers. The findings are sustained by a decade of research
into the Chinese legal system, input from international scholars
with extensive comparative knowledge of FDI regulation, and data
gathered through interviews with European and US companies

(2015); PETER HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL
SYSTEM (1997).
24. CORNE, supra note 23, at 19. See also People: Peter Corne, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
(2021) https://www.dorsey.com/people/c/corne-peter [https://perma.cc/9KJJ-P22Z].
25. Id. at 20.
26. See generally ANGELA HUYUE ZHANG, CHINESE ANTITRUST EXCEPTIONALISM (2021).
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that have invested in China and members of the legal profession in
Beijing.27
II. MERGER CONTROL AS FDI GATEKEEPER
The IMF defines FDI as “the category of international
investment that reflects the objective of a resident entity in one
economy obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in
another economy.”28 Indeed, mergers and acquisitions are “the
most important FDI mode in China, and foreign investors
preferably enter the Chinese market by acquiring leading domestic
companies.”29 As a consequence, merger control provisions may
affect the flow of FDI into the country, but only with regard to the
initial transaction forming the relationship between the overseas
investor and the targeted local company.30 Thereafter, any
subsequent dealings between the two entities would still classify
as FDI, but would not trigger a merger review process.
A. The Anti-Monopoly Law and Its Potential to Interfere with FDI
China’s antitrust legislation, the Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”),
entered into force in 2008,31 replacing piecemeal antitrust rules
spread over multiple statutes.32 Chapter IV of the AML deals with
the “concentration of undertakings,” and allows the State
Administration for Market Regulation (“SAMR”) to scrutinize
operations that exceed certain pre-established thresholds.33 The

27. Ethics clearance for the interviews was granted by the Chinese University of
Hong Kong’s Survey and Behavioral Research Ethics Committee.
28. INT’L MONETARY FUND, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL 86 (1993)
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bop/bopman.pdf.
29. WEINREICH-ZHAO, supra note 2, at 27.
30. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 28, at 86.
31. (中华人民共和国反垄断法) [ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007,
effective
Aug.
1
2008)
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/2013
0300045909.shtml [https://perma.cc/487Y-XE4F] [hereinafter AML].
32. For an overview of the legal framework for competition issues prior to the AML,
see Zhenguo Wu, Perspectives on the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, 75 ANTITRUST L. J. 73
(2008).
33. See (国务院关于经营者集中申报标准的规定) [PROVISIONS OF THE STATE COUNCIL
ON THE STANDARD FOR DECLARATION OF CONCENTRATION OF BUSINESS OPERATORS] (promulgated
by Order No. 529 of the State Council, Aug. 3, 2008, effective May 20, 2020)
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analysis conducted under these provisions should be limited to the
competition concerns spurred by the acquisition,34 and stay clear
of industrial policy or national security considerations.35 Indeed,
Article 28 of the AML refers to prohibiting a merger only in the
event that the relevant antitrust agency concludes that it “leads, or
may lead, to elimination or restriction of competition.”36
Notwithstanding this premise, there is always the
possibility—both in China and elsewhere—that merger control is
strategically employed to restrain the entry of non-national
businesses into local markets. In fact, prior to the adoption of the
AML, specific conditions were introduced for mergers giving
foreign investors control of Chinese companies in key industries,
impacting national security, or affecting notorious national
brands.37 Rather ambiguously, the AML lists “the impact of [the]
concentration on the development of the national economy”
among the factors to be taken into account when deciding whether
a merger should be approved.38 This could potentially open the
door to protectionist considerations eclipsing the traditional goals
of competition law. According to Steve Dickinson, an expert in the
field,39 there are certain unwritten norms when it comes to
investment by-way-of acquisition of Chinese companies:
http://gkml.samr.gov.cn/nsjg/fldj/202005/t20200526_315561.html
[https://perma.cc/V9LC-CKED].
34. This applies to all merger control regimes around the world. In the context of E.U.
merger control, Commissioner Margrethe Vestager has said that merger control rules
allow “companies to grow by acquiring other businesses while at the same time preserving
choice, quality, innovation and competitive prices.” See European Commission,
Statement/19/889. Commissioner Vestager on the Proposed Acquisition of Alstom by
Siemens and the Proposed Acquisition of Arubis Rolled Products and Schwermetall by
Wieland
(Feb.
6,
2019)
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_19_889
[https://perma.cc/K6ZX-AC4V].
35. Id. (discussing the complementarity of industrial policy and competition
enforcement).
36. AML, supra note 31, art. 28.
37. (关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定) [INTERIM PROVISIONS ON MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS OF DOMESTIC ENTERPRISES BY FOREIGN INVESTORS] (promulgated Sep. 8, 2006),
art. 12, translated in Interim Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises
by Foreign Investors, MINISTRY OF COM. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/2013
0300045825.shtml [https://perma.cc/N7SY-43XC].
38. AML, supra note 31, art. 27.
39. Steve Dickinson, HARRIS BRICKEN, https://harrisbricken.com/our-team/stevedickinson/ [https://perma.cc/6G2G-N49B].
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Foreigners are permitted to purchase small established
Chinese companies where the government is too busy to be
concerned with the management of the small company.
Foreigners are permitted to purchase large established
Chinese companies suffering from financial problems,
provided that the foreign purchaser will restructure the
company and assume the company’s obligations to workers
and creditors.
Foreigners are permitted to acquire a minority interest in
large and successful Chinese companies, provided such
investment will provide collateral benefits in the form of
technology transfer or access to new markets.
Foreigners are not permitted under any circumstances to
purchase a majority interest in a large and successful
established Chinese company.40

In the European Union, the European Commission has stood
firmly against the use of merger control regulations for anything
other than the competitive assessment of concentrations.41 In
order to maintain the “purity” of merger control, Regulation
2019/452 came into force in October 2020 with measures aimed
at ensuring adequate FDI screening in the European Union (often
conducted by national competition authorities).42 It is unclear,
however, whether other parts of the world, including China, are
equally rigorous when separating competition and national
security concerns. Since the adoption of the AML, pundits have
speculated that the law could turn into “another weapon that China
could use against foreign companies.”43

40. David Wolf, The Huiyuan Test, SILICON HUTONG (Sep. 8, 2008),
http://siliconhutong.com/2008/09/08/the-huiyuan-test/
[https://perma.cc/2P4HGYJH] (quoting Steve Michael Dickinson’s China Law Blog originally published in 2008,
which is no longer available).
41. See European Commission, Statement by Vestager, supra note 34.
42. Commission Regulation 2019/452 of Mar. 19, 2019, Establishing a Framework
for the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments into the Union 2019 O.J. (LI79/1).
Screening is often conducted by national competition authorities. Id.
43. Angela Huyue Zhang, Problems in Following EU Competition Law: A Case Study of
Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, 3 PEKING UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 96, 99 (2011).
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B. Practical Application of Merger Control to FDI-Related
Transactions
Less than a year after the AML came into effect, China’s
Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) appeared to confirm fears of
the strategic use of merger control when it blocked Coca-Cola’s
acquisition of Huiyuan, a well-known Chinese fruit juice
producer.44 According to the MOFCOM, there were three main
concerns relating to the concentration: first, Coca-Cola would be
able to leverage its dominance of the carbonated cola drinks
market into the fruit juice market through practices such as tying
and bundling; second, Coca-Cola already owned Minute Maid,
another juice brand present in China,45 and post-merger it would
have greater control of the fruit juice market (even though the
market share would remain below thirty percent); and, finally,
smaller competitors could be squeezed out of the market.46
The MOFCOM explained that the remedies offered by CocaCola were insufficient to address these reservations, and thus the
merger could not proceed. Rather disappointingly, the brief
decision perhaps failed to encapsulate the sophisticated theories
of harm we have come to expect of established competition
agencies when they block a concentration—more so if there are
political sensitivities at stake. The case sparked strong
international criticism,47 with the outcome described as “very
unfortunate . . . in an industry that has no economic or nationalsecurity significance.”48
44. (商务部关于禁止可口可乐公司收购中国汇源公司审查决定的公告#中华人民共
和国商务部公告 [2009] 第22) [MOFCOM NOTICE ON THE REVIEW DECISION TO PROHIBIT COCAACQUISITION
OF
CHINA
HUIYUAN
CO
[2009]
No
22]
COLA’S
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200903/20090306108494.html?946530605=1
71424798 [https://perma.cc/M43U-F9TD] [hereinafter COCA-COLA/HUIYUAN DECISION].
45. Meizhiyuan is the name of Minute Maid’s China branch.
46. COCA-COLA/HUIYUAN DECISION, supra note 44.
47. See Coca-Cola’s Failed Bid for China Huiyuan Juice: The Return of Protectionism?,
Knowledge
@
Wharton
Blog
(Apr.
1,
2009),
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/coca-colas-failed-bid-for-china-huiyuanjuice-the-return-of-protectionism/ [https://perma.cc/P4KJ-DHQU] [archived Aug. 10,
2021]; Squeezed Out, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 18, 2009); Rick Carew et al., China Denies
ST. J.
(Mar.
21,
2009),
Protectionism
in
Coca-Cola
Ruling,
WALL
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123751554403891673#cx [https://perma.cc/PF3SAWZE]. For a balanced account, see Shaun Rein, What Coca-Cola Did Wrong, and Right, in
China, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2009), https://www.forbes.com/2009/03/24/coca-cola-chinaleadership-citizenship-huiyuan.html [https://perma.cc/3QZ9-6TY9].
48. THE ECONOMIST, Squeezed Out, supra note 47 (citing Lester Ross).
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C. Outlook: The Significance of FDI Considerations in China’s
Merger Control Policy Development
The media reports on the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan fiasco provide a
good example of the wariness, or mistrust, that at times permeates
analysis of China’s legal developments.49 The Economist, for
instance, reported—citing hearsay among lawyers and bankers—
that the decision was “a political response to critical comments by
America’s [Obama] administration,” showing that “foreign
companies might be the primary targets of the new law.”50 There
is no reference to, or analysis of, the competition concerns
highlighted by the MOFCOM in its denial of the merger. Another
commentator speculated that the deal would be “discussed at high
levels of the Chinese government” because a popular local
company was the target of a US multinational corporation.51
The outcome of this merger review process could be
interpreted as a validation of Dickinson’s assertion about the
improbability of foreign companies purchasing a successful or
emblematic Chinese business in any sector.52 Yet, more than a
decade after, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the
concerns were not entirely justified, as the decision did not signal
the beginning of an anti-FDI trend in Chinese merger control.53 In
2011, Angela Zhang questioned the logic of the protectionist
narrative, bearing in mind, inter alia, the relative irrelevance of the
market to national security, and the fact that Huiyuan was already
partially owned by foreign companies before Coca-Cola came into
the picture.54 Given that China’s own business community was
already heavily investing in other countries,55 it would seem wise
49. See supra Part I.
50. THE ECONOMIST, Squeezed Out, supra note 47.
51. Wolf, supra note 40.
52. Id.
53. The only other merger blocked was the so-called ‘P3 Alliance,’ which would have
combined container carriers Maersk Line, Mediterranean Shipping Company, and CMA
CGM. See MOFCOM Announcement No 46 of 2014 Prohibiting Maersk, MSC and CMA CGM
from Establishing a Network Centre, MINISTRY OF COM. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (June 20,
2014),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/buwei/201407/20140700663862.s
html [https://perma.cc/NEA9-KB4V].
54. Zhang, Problems in Following EU Competition Law, supra note 43, at 98–99.
55. But see Thilo Hanemann & Danial H Rosen, Who’s Buying Whom? COVID-19 and
(June
18,
2020),
China
Cross-Border
M&A
Trends,
RHODIUM GROUP
https://rhg.com/research/whos-buying-whom/
[https://perma.cc/5TY4-LPDQ]
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for the authorities to pursue reciprocity by refraining from
imposing groundless hurdles to incoming FDI. Importantly, recent
developments suggest that international buyers have managed to
successfully acquire important Chinese enterprises.56 In 2020,
Pepsi purchased the snack brand Be & Cheery,57 while Volkswagen
spent over US$1 billion for a fifty percent stake in the state-owned
Anhui Jianghuai Automotive Group, taking control of its existing
joint venture with the company.58 The trend looks set to continue:
in June 2021, JPMorgan Chase announced plans to purchase one
hundred percent of its securities joint venture partner in China.59
Further, it should be noted that protectionism claims in the
application of competition law often emerge when those affected
by a decision do not like the outcome. One need only look at the
commentary prompted by the European Commission’s General
Electric/Honeywell decision,60 which ended the proposed merger
of the two US companies, or at the disapproval of the penalties
imposed on Google, Qualcomm, Facebook, and Intel in the
European Union.61 Rather than revealing a protectionist agenda,
the outcomes of these investigations reflect robust differences in
antitrust policies across jurisdictions.62 Unlike the United States,
the European Union and China are not strongly influenced by the
Chicago School’s laissez-faire approach to merger control, and thus
(explaining that in 2020 China’s outbound merger numbers ‘collapsed compared to
previous years’).
56. Id.
57. Yingzhi Yang & Brenda Goh, PepsiCo Buys Chinese Snack Brand Be & Cheery for
$705 Million, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pepsicochina-idUSKCN20I07R [https://perma.cc/ZK7E-HGAG].
58. Julie Zhu & Edward Taylor, Exclusive: Volkswagen in Final Talks to Seal Biggest
M&A Deals in China EV Sector—Sources, REUTERS (May 27, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-volkswagen-investment-china-exclusiveidUSKBN2330F1 [https://perma.cc/KFC4-2XZH].
59. See Thomas Hale, JPMorgan Applies to Take Full Control of China Securities
Venture, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jun. 3, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/3bd19ceb-50ed4555-a3e3-e06401b77879 [https://perma.cc/R5ZZ-UZRD].
60. General Electric/Honeywell (Case COMP/M.2220) Commission Decision
2004/134/EC [2004] OJ L48/1, confirmed by Case T-209/01 Honeywell International Inc
v Commission [2005] ECR II-5527.
61. See, e.g., Charlene Barshefsky, EU Digital Protectionism Risks Damaging Ties with
the US, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 2, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/9edea4f5-5f34-4e1789cd-f9b9ba698103 [https://perma.cc/AGL3-YDXT].
62. See generally Sandra Marco Colino, The Antitrust F Word: Fairness Considerations
in Competition Law, J. BUS. L. 329 (2019). See also Anu Bradford et al., Is EU Merger Control
Used for Protectionism? An Empirical Analysis, 15 J. EMP. L. STUD. 165 (2018).
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competition law enforcement remains more energetic.63 As a
consequence, before raising the protectionist flag, any potentially
credible alternative explanations should be ruled out.
In light of these considerations, the most plausible scenario is
that two factors weighed heavily on the outcome of the brief, and
arguably flawed, decision in Coca-Cola/Huiyuan.64 First, it is at
least conceivable that, only months after the AML’s entry into force,
the MOFCOM’s lack of familiarity with the application of
competition law meant that it was not prepared to conduct an
analysis as sharp as necessary for a transaction of this
complexity.65 After more than a decade of AML enforcement,
however, this impediment should have all but vanished. Second,
bearing in mind the relevance of unwritten traditions in the
country,66 and Western investors’ frequent unfamiliarity with
Chinese business customs, Coca-Cola may simply not played its
cards right. In fact, months before the decision was announced,
David Wolf predicted that the deal’s approval would be largely
dependent on “how well [Coca-Cola] handles the government
debates and public discussion on the deal’s merit.”67 With regard
to this second issue, the increased presence of overseas investors
in China suggests that they are getting the hang of corporate
negotiations in the country, and that perhaps enforcers afford
them greater latitude.
These observations, while encouraging, do not completely
rule out strategic uses of merger control in operations involving
foreign firms. In 2018, coinciding with increased tensions in
China’s trade relationship with the United States, tech giant
Qualcomm failed to obtain timely clearance from the SAMR for the
purchase
of
Dutch
semiconductor
producer
NXP.68

63. But see William E Kovacic, The Chicago Obsession in the Interpretation of US
Antitrust History, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 459 (2020) (claiming that the influence of the Chicago
School in U.S. antitrust policy development has been overstated).
64. See generally, COCA-COLA/HUIYUAN DECISION, supra note 44.
65. Zhang, Problems in Following EU Competition Law, supra note 43, at 102-18
(highlighting how the rationale employed by the MOFCOM mirrors early European
Commission decisions, based on theories that have now been abandoned in the EU and in
other parts of the world).
66. See supra Part I.
67. Wolf, supra note 40.
68. Michael Martina & Stephen Nellis, Qualcomm Ends $44 Million NXP Bid After
(July
25,
2018),
Failing
to
Win
China
Approval,
REUTERS
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Consequentially, the operation was abandoned despite being
greenlit in eight other jurisdictions.69 Qualcomm’s CEO speculated
that it “got caught up in something that was above” them.70 The
SAMR defended its stance positing that its concerns had not been
properly addressed by the deadline.71 A later statement from the
SAMR expressing its willingness to continue talks when it was
already too late was interpreted as a gesture “to counter
perceptions [that] the deal approval process was politicized, not to
revive it.”72 Accordingly, the risk of contaminating merger control
analysis with political considerations has not completely vanished.
As long as the trade frictions continue, there is always a risk that
some degree of protectionism will result.
III. CHINA’S FRAGMENTARY INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS ON
INVESTMENT
The most effective way of facilitating FDI while
simultaneously ensuring adequate screening mechanisms involves
the adoption of a suitable regulatory framework specifically
designed to deal with these issues. This can be done externally by
assuming international obligations through IIAs, or internally by
way of national legislation. This section examines the transnational
sphere, while China’s national FDI laws are assessed in the
following section. According to the relevant Chinese law, in the
event that an international agreement signed by China contains
more favorable terms than the national legislation, the conflict will
be interpreted in dubio pro investor: the international rules will
prevail.73

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nxp-semicondtrs-m-a-qualcomm-idUSKBN1KF193
[https://perma.cc/H43H-FAB4].
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Adam Jourdan, China Says It is Still Open to Talks on Scrapped Qualcomm-NXP
Takeover, REUTERS (Jul. 27, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nxp-semicondtrsm-a-qualcomm-idUKKBN1KH01E [https://perma.cc/VNB6-3M8H].
72. Id.
73. FIL, supra note 7, art. 4.
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A. The Irregular Landscape of International Investment
Responsibilities
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 signaled a change in the
country’s approach to FDI,74 and membership duties constituted a
first crucial step toward liberalization. Despite the
complementarity of investment and trade,75 the legal framework
for the former remains startlingly underdeveloped when
compared with the “far more elaborate” multilateral rules that
guide the latter.76 This progress pattern is not unusual. Even within
the European Union, liberalizing trade in goods has been far more
straightforward than accomplishing free movement of capital.77
Regrettably, the immediate consequence of this underdeveloped
legal framework for FDI is a patchy regulatory arena, often
embodied by sector-specific rules aimed principally at trade and
only indirectly touching upon investment issues.
In the 1990s, an attempt to adopt a Multilateral Agreement on
Investment in the context of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) did not prosper,78 with
critics questioning both the need for and the benefits to developing
countries of such an accord.79 In this context, bilateral and
plurilateral80 mechanisms often continue to be vital in order to
74. See, e.g., Carlos Aurelio Esplugues, China’s Accession to WTO, in CHINESE BUSINESS
LAW 1 (Yuanshi Bu ed., 2010).
75. Vocke, supra note 8, at 5.
76. Id. at 4.
77. See, e.g., Katharina Gnath et al., Financial Market Integration in the EU: A Practical
Inventory of Benefits and Hurdles in the Single Market, BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG (2019),
https://www.bertelsmannstiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/EZ_Financial_Market
_Integration_2019_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/TN7N-VQA7]; John A. Usher, The Evolution
of the Free Movement of Capital, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1533 (2007).
78. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Multilateral
Agreement
on
Investment
(MAI)
(never
adopted),
https://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/multilateralagr
eementoninvestment.htm [https://perma.cc/EQ88-SXW6].
79. Peter Nunnenkamp & Manoj Pant, Why the Case for a Multilateral Agreement on
Investment Is Weak, (Kieler Diskussionbeiträge, Working Paper No. 400, 2003),
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/2931/1/kd400.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LP7A-BND2].
80. Plurilateral incentives kick in when multilateralism fails to meet certain
objectives. They involve cooperation between the countries “willing to move forward with
the liberalisation process” in the absence of broader multilateral action. See Yonov
Frederick Agah, Plurilateralism Against Multilateralism? A Multi-stakeholder Perspective,
PUBLIC
FORUM
(2012)
WTO
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secure more extensive reciprocal investment advantages. Below,
both the WTO framework and China’s additional IIAs are explored.
Particular attention is paid to the agreements China has negotiated
with the United States and the European Union.
B. The Boundaries of the Basic WTO Framework
Some of China’s WTO obligations directly or indirectly impact
foreign investment. For instance, the Agreement on Trade Related
Investment Measures (“TRIMS”) contains certain relevant
provisions, but only for investment in goods.81 Its main aims are
“the expansion and progressive liberalization of world trade and to
facilitate investment across international frontiers so as to
increase economic growth of all trading partners . . . while ensuring
free competition.”82 The accord precludes WTO members from
discriminating (in law or in practice) or implementing quantitative
restrictions against imported products. What this means for
investment is that, if any national measures regarding FDI could
negatively affect imports from or exports to other WTO countries,
they would be inapplicable.83 Notwithstanding these
commitments, China has opened most of its manufacturing sector
by its own initiative through national legislation.84 Therefore, the
relevance of TRIMS for FDI into China remains fairly trivial. In a
similar vein, tangentially connected to FDI are the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”),
affording protection to overseas investors’ intellectual property
(“IP”),85 and the Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”), which is relevant
for investment in energy products.86
https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum12_e/session29agah_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y7Z6-DKHU].
81. Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measure, Jan. 1, 1995, Art. 1,
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/18-trims_e.htm [https://perma.cc/MP7EPM5P] [hereinafter TRIMS Agreement].
82. Id. pmbl.
83. Id. art. 2.
84. See infra Part IV.
85. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights, effective Jan.
1,
1995,
amended
Jan.
23,
2017,
Art.
68,
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/31bis_trips_01_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/YRC8-F6A7] [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
86. Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), Apr. 16, 1998, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100
https://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECTPositive_Annex_W.pdf [https://perma.cc/CBA8-8T36].
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Unlike manufacturing, the liberalization of services requires a
significant international push. In the context of its WTO
membership, China is committed to the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (“GATS”),87 described as “the only multilateral
agreement that covers investment.”88 On the basis of GATS, China
opened certain services to FDI. However, full market access was
only agreed upon for twenty-six out of the 162 sectors listed by the
WTO.89 In four of these sectors foreign companies face additional
requirements inapplicable to national investors.90 In another
seventy-one sectors, it is possible to invest, but with significant
constraints, such as the requirement to form a joint venture with a
local business.91 This amounts to rather modest market
accessibility, particularly when compared to that which other
members have agreed to.92 Moreover, while GATS normally
imposes an unconditional obligation to guarantee WTO members’
service providers a most-favored nation (“MFN”) treatment,93
China has not fully embraced this pledge.94
Notably, upon joining the WTO, China committed to ensuring
that its authorities would not condition the right of investment on

87. GATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services, effective Jan. 1, 1995,
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4M4XDA9N]; WTO, PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WT/L/432 (Nov.
23, 2001). For China’s specific commitments, see WTO, THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
SCHEDULE
OF
SPECIFIC
COMMITMENTS
GATS/SC/135
(Feb.
14,
2002)
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=71613,11725,21775,25776,34016&CurrentCatalo
gueIdIndex=2&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasS
panishRecord=True [https://perma.cc/GM5S-JPME].
88. Petros C. Mavroidis & André Sapir, China and the World Trade Organisation:
Towards a Better Fit, BRUEGEL 8 (Jun. 11, 2019), https://www.bruegel.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/WP-2019-06-110619_.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT2T-56ZA].
The assertion remains true given the failure of the MAI. See OECD, supra note 71.
89. GATT Secretariat, Services Sectoral Classification List, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNS/W/120 (July 10, 1991).
90. Uri Dadush & André Sapir, Is the European Union’s Investment Agreement with
China Underrated?, BRUEGEL 6 (Mar. 2021) https://www.bruegel.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/04/PC-09-2021_.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2MB-H9S7].
91. PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION, supra note 87; GATS, supra note 87.
92. Dadush & Sapir, supra note 90, at 6.
93. GATS, supra note 87, art. 2.
94. Stephen Ezell, False Promises II: The Continuing Gap Between China’s WTO
Commitments and Its Practices Information, Tech. & Innovation Found. (July 26, 2021),
https://itif.org/publications/2021/07/26/false-promises-ii-continuing-gap-betweenchinas-wto-commitments-and-its [https://perma.cc/58XB-Q9NT].
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the transfer technology to Chinese firms.95 This pledge is
particularly relevant in light of the claims frequently made by
foreign investors that they are coerced to transfer their IP rights.
This issue will be discussed at length in the assessment of the
Chinese FDI legislation.96
C. The Web of Bilateral and Plurilateral Agreements Establishing
Investment Obligations
The most recent data available97 suggest that China is party to
109 active Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”)98 and nineteen
Treaties with Investment Provisions (“TIPs”).99 The signatories to
these include China’s own special administrative regions,100
countries such as the United Kingdom, Turkey, Canada, and EU
Member States,101 as well as extensive regions such as the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”)102 and the Asia-

95. PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION, supra note 87, § 7(3).
96. See infra Part IV.
97. World Bank Group, 2019 Investment Policy and Regulatory Review: China (2020),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33600/China-2019Investment-Policy-and-Regulatory-Review.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
[https://perma.cc/4Y9B-ATZJ].
98. A BIT is “an agreement between two countries which establishes a framework to
promote and protect the investments made by investors from the respective countries into
each other’s territory.” Christopher J Bailey & Flora Jones, A Guide to International
Investment Agreements, ISDS PLATFORM (Jan. 25, 2017) http://isds.bilaterals.org/?a-guideto-international&lang=en [https://perma.cc/257Q-FJS9].
99. TIPs are various kinds of “economic agreements other than BITs that include
investment-related provisions.” Susan F Stone, Investment Provisions in PTAs and How They
Contribute to Inclusive Trade, U.N. ECON. AND SOC. COMM’N FOR ASIA AND THE PAC., 5 (June
2017),
https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/5.1Investment%20provisions%20in%20P
TAs%20and%20how%20they%20contribute%20to%20inclusive%20trade.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4HZJ-NUDW].
100. Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA)
Investment
Agreement,
China-H.K.,
June
28,
2017,
https://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/legaltext/cepa14.html [https://perma.cc/LUZ8EBJ5].
101. The full list of China’s BITs is available on the UNCTAD’s website,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investmentagreements/countries/42/china [https://perma.cc/ZJR8-LRC8]. The TIPs can be found at
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investmentagreements/countries/42/china [https://perma.cc/WGC2-6JAT].
102. ASEAN–China
Investment
Agreement,
Jan.
1,
2010,
https://asean.org/storage/images/archive/22974.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JA9-2V2Q].
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Pacific.103 IIAs are all individually drafted, and therefore contain
tailored provisions responding to the priorities of each of the
parties. However, there are meaningful commonalities present in
the majority of these treaties. They usually guarantee reciprocal
fairness and equity in the treatment of foreign investors; contain a
right to compensation for expropriation; propel the free
movement of capital linked to investment; lay down dispute
settlement mechanisms; make assurances regarding MFN
treatment; and specify the areas open to investment and which
conditions (if any) apply to investment, as well as outline relevant
exclusions.
1. The Failed Attempts to Strike an Investment Deal with the
United States
In the list of BITs and TIPs China is party to,104 the United
States is conspicuously absent. Negotiations between China and
the United States have taken place in fits and starts since 2008 but
have never culminated in a deal. The most recent attempt took off
in 2013 but ended abruptly when Donald Trump was elected
president.105 Instead, the United States has relied on the general
WTO framework and ad hoc arrangements to protect American
investors in China.106
In January 2020, however, coinciding with the onset of the
COVID-19 crisis, the Trump administration signed known as the
US-China Phase One Agreement (“Phase One”).107 Described as “a

103. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), signed Nov. 15, 2020,
(not yet in force) https://rcepsec.org/legal-text/ [https://perma.cc/9B5A-UBFU].
104. See supra notes 100-103.
105. Alicia García-Herrero, The EU-China Investment Deal May Be Anachronic in a
Bifurcating World, BRUEGEL (Apr. 6, 2021), https://www.bruegel.org/2021/04/the-euchina-investment-deal-may-be-anachronic-in-a-bifurcating-world/
[https://perma.cc/MC3W-FZSF].
106. Chris Devonshire-Ellis, Prospects for a 2020 US–China Bilateral Investment
Treaty, CHINA BRIEFING (Dec. 27, 2019), https://www.china-briefing.com/news/prospects2020-us-china-bilateral-investment-treaty/ [https://perma.cc/EQ38-5M7J].
107. Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (Phase One Agreement),
U.S.-China,
(adopted
Jan.
15,
2020,
in
force
Feb.
14,
2020),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement/Eco
nomic_And_Trade_Agreement_Between_The_United_States_And_China_Text.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R42Q-U6WA] [hereinafter Phase One Agreement].
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temporary truce in [the parties’] 18-month trade war,”108 Phase
One contains a US commitment to lower, albeit modestly, some of
the tariffs levied on imported Chinese products. In exchange, China
agreed to purchase an additional US$200 billion worth of US
“manufactured goods, agricultural goods, energy products, and
services” over the course of two years.109 Phase One also outlines
assurances concerning the protection of IP rights, including
measures to combat the misappropriation of trade secrets (likely
motivated by the Huawei saga),110 patent protection, and specific
measures against counterfeit goods.111 Importantly, there is an
entire chapter devoted to forced technology transfers (“FTTs”),
expressing concerns over these practices and stressing the
“importance that the transfer of technology occurs on voluntary,
market-based terms.”112 It includes a mutual commitment against
procedures that require such transfers or pressure companies to
grant them.113 Another significant development is the
liberalization of China’s financial services, which had previously
been inaccessible for US investors.114 Finally, one of the key
achievements for both the US and Chinese negotiators115 was the
establishment of a detailed dispute resolution mechanism which

108. Bradsher, supra note 12.
109. Phase One Agreement, supra note 107, art. 6(2).
110. Huawei is currently being investigated for allegedly stealing trade secrets.
Moreover, according to documents leaked by Edward Snowden to the New York Times, in
2007 the U.S. National Security Service (NSA), fearing links to the People’s Liberation
Army, would have spied on Huawei and accessed the source code of the company’s goods.
See U.S. Department of Justice Press Release, Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate
Huawei and Subsidiaries Charged in Racketeering Conspiracy and Conspiracy to Steal
Trade
Secrets
(Feb.
13,
2020)
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinesetelecommunications-conglomerate-huawei-and-subsidiaries-charged-racketeering
[https://perma.cc/U925-2MD4]; Norman Pearlstine et al., The War Against Huawei: Why
the US is Trying to Destroy China’s Most Successful Brand, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-fg-huawei-timeline/
[https://perma.cc/B8GYRPDD] (containing a full timeline of the steps taken against Huawei in the United States);
David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, NSA Breached Chinese Servers Seen as Security Threat,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsabreached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html [https://perma.cc/FF2M-WN88]; Colin
Hawes, Why Is Huawei’s Ownership so Strange? A Case Study of the Chinese Corporate and
Socio-Political Ecosystem, 21 J. OF CORP. L. STUD. 1 (2021).
111. Phase One Agreement, supra note 107, ch. 1.
112. Id. ch. 2.
113. Id. arts. 2(2) and (3).
114. Id. ch. 4.
115. US-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 4.

296

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:2

created a high-level Trade Framework Group to discuss
implementation particulars, and created a Bilateral Evaluation and
Dispute Resolution Office in both countries to investigate specific
complaints.116
The agreement is another example of a trade deal with some,
albeit peripheral, implications for investment. When compared to
the default WTO rules, the improvements are modest at best, but
hopefully represent a first step toward a more far-reaching,
investment-specific deal. In her confirmation hearings in March
2021, US Trade Representative Katherine Tai promised a
“comprehensive review” of the Phase One commitments.117
However, no further progress has been announced, and hopes that
the Biden administration would meaningfully slash the tariffs on
Chinese goods have been frustrated.118
Some press reports also suggest that China has not been living
up to its Phase One compromises.119 Indeed, figures from 2020
indicate that the nation purchased less than sixty percent of the
promised additional US products,120 and US Trade Secretary Tom
Vilsack has acknowledged that China could be doing more in
certain sectors.121 However, these data appear to be taken out of
context. Vilsack was referring to punctual areas where there is still
room for improvement, and has generally expressed satisfaction

116. Phase One Agreement, supra note 107, ch. 7.
117. Eric Martin, Biden Trade Pick Tai Pledges to Ensure China Tariffs Appropriate,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-0301/biden-trade-pick-tai-pledges-to-ensure-china-tariffs-appropriate
[https://perma.cc/G562-E3EZ].
118. Aime Williams, Persistence of Donald Trump’s China Tariffs Frustrates US
Business, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jun. 3, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/fb775a22-eaa544b4-8643-16c3f40a5d02 [https://perma.cc/B7YS-PWUC].
119. See e.g., Yen Nee Lee, China Failed to Buy Agreed Amounts of US Goods under
“Phase
One”
Trade
Deal,
Data
Shows,
CNBC
(Jan.
22,
2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/22/china-failed-to-buy-agreed-amounts-of-us-goodsin-phase-one-trade-deal-data.html [https://perma.cc/L8D8-NWAM].
120. Chad P Brown, US–China Phase One Tracker: China’s Purchases of US Goods,
PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Apr. 25, 20201), https://www.piie.com/research/piiecharts/us-china-phase-one-tracker-chinas-purchases-us-goods [https://perma.cc/6PHBJQ4S].
121. Kellan Heavican, Vilsack Says China Not Meeting Phase One Trade Requirements,
AG
NEWS
FOR
AMERICA
(Mar.
26,
2021),
BROWNFIELD
https://brownfieldagnews.com/news/vilsack-says-chinas-not-meeting-phase-one-traderequirements/ [https://perma.cc/VP3T-Z8RL].
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with China’s compliance with Phase One.122 Importantly, the
targets were set prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Phase One
Agreement itself refers to “market conditions, particularly in the
case of agricultural goods,” as possibly dictating “the timing of
purchases within any given year.”123 In light of the unprecedented
crisis, it is understandable that flexibility might be required
regarding the observance of the assurances given when the
agreement was concluded.
2. The EU–China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment
In December 2020, after almost a decade of discussions, China
and the European Union agreed on the terms of a draft EU–China
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (“CAI”).124 Its main
purpose is to guarantee reciprocal terms for investors from one
territory into the other, with enhanced legal certainty and
transparency125 so as to foster “a better climate to facilitate and
develop trade and investment between the Parties.”126 The
agreement constitutes an attempt to ensure that China becomes as
open to FDI as the EU, particularly in services.127 According to the
European Commission, there will be “a greater level of market
access for EU investors than ever before” if the agreement is
ratified.128 It outlines a specified list of activities, all within twelve
main areas of investment, in which investors from China and the
European Union will have access to: the business sector (including
legal, medical, and computer services), communications

122. Thomas Franck & Kayla Tausche, China Seems to be Living Up to Trade Deal
Pledges,
Biden’s
Agriculture
Secretary
Says,
CNBC
(Feb.
25,
2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/25/china-living-up-to-trade-deal-promises-bidensagriculture-secretary-says.html [https://perma.cc/ZQ4Q-BHLX].
123. Phase One Agreement, supra note 107, art. 6(2), ¶ 5.
124. Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, China-E.U., agreement in principle
Dec.
30,
2020,
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2237
[https://perma.cc/96EQ-VVBC] [hereinafter CAI].
125. Id. Section II art. 3(b)(4) (covering transparency).
126. Id. § I. Moreover, the preamble states that the parties are “COMITTED to building
their economic relationship based on openness, reciprocity and mutual benefit, ensuring
non-discrimination, a level playing field, transparency, and a predictable and rule-based
investment environment.” (emphasis in original). Id. pmbl.
127. See supra Section II.A.
128. EU and China Reach Agreement in Principle on Investment, EUR. COMM’N (Dec. 30,
2020),
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2233
[https://perma.cc/QP8E-8ZPP].
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(encompassing telecoms, audiovisual, or even cinema services)
construction and engineering, distribution, education (excluding
national compulsory education and special education such as
military training), environmental services, financial services,
health and social services, tourism, sports, transport, and thirty
manufacturing sectors.129
From the EU perspective, the agreement would help eliminate
enduring barriers to FDI. When compared to WTO commitments130
and Chinese law obligations,131 the list of investment-friendly
sectors entails an increase, albeit modest, in the areas accessible to
European businesses. Moreover, the requirements that EU
investors must comply with would be relaxed, as the agreement
would remove barriers to entry including the requirements that
investors enter into a joint venture with a Chinese company132 or
share technology to qualify.133 Of particular relevance is the
pressure to ratify various International Labor Organization (“ILO”)
conventions relating to forced labor.134 China has displayed a
willingness to abide by the high labor and environmental
standards that the European Union usually requires when drafting
trade agreements.135 However, to date, no binding commitments
have been made in this regard.
Competition concerns feature prominently in the CAI. In
addition to tackling the controversy around FTTs, there is an
attempt to level the playing field by addressing issues related to
state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”).136 Also referred to as “covered
entities,” SOEs include companies in which the state has the power

129. CAI, supra note 124, annex III.
130. See supra Section II.A.
131. See infra Part III.
132. CAI, supra note 124, § II, art. 2(b).
133. Id. § II, art. 3. See discussion infra Part III.
134. CAI, supra note 124, § IV.1, art. 1 and 4.
135. CAI, supra note 124, § IV deals with investment and sustainable development;
see also Lise Johnson et al., Aligning International Investment Agreements with the
Sustainable Development Goals, 58 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 58 (2019) (highlighting the
importance of FDI for sustainable development).
136. See William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy and State-Owned Enterprises in China,
16 WORLD TRADE REV. 693 (2017) (discussing competition concerns spurred by SOEs);
Justin Yifu Lin et al., Competition, Policy Burdens, a State-Owned Enterprise Reform, 88
AMERICAN ECON. REV. 422 (1998); Angela Huyue Zhang, The Antitrust Paradox of China, Inc.,
50 INT’L L. AND POL. 159 (2017); Jochem de Kok, Chinese SOEs Under EU Competition Law,
40 WORLD COMPETITION: L. AND ECON. REV. 583 (2017).
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to appoint directors or control the decision-making process, and
those operated by any level of government.137 To ensure nondiscrimination, SOEs will “act in accordance with commercial
considerations in their purchases or sales of goods or services,”
and there is a mutual commitment to grant equal treatment to
investors from the other party and national enterprises.138 In the
event that there is doubt as to whether these obligations are being
fulfilled, investors can file an information request about the
relevant commercial activities, and a dispute resolution procedure
may be triggered if the situation escalates further.139
Another important step toward the effective protection of
competition is the possibility to exert control over the subsidies
granted to national firms, including SOEs, that can provide an
unfair advantage in the marketplace. The parties to the CAI commit
to announcing “on a publicly accessible website the objective, legal
basis, form, amount or amount budgeted for, and recipient” of any
relevant funding.140 Beyond the CAI, the European Union is
positioned to take separate regulatory steps in this regard. In May
2021, the European Commission published a draft regulation to
address the distortions caused by foreign subsidies in the single
market.141 If adopted, this regulation will give the European
Commission the power to “investigate financial contributions
granted by public authorities of a non-EU country which benefit
companies engaging in an economic activity in the European Union
and redress their distortive effects.”142
The CAI has been attacked on multiple fronts.143 The main
criticisms relate to the high cost the European Union may shoulder
137. CAI, supra note 124, § II art. 3.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. CAI, supra note 124, § III, art. 8.
141. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Foreign Subsidies Distorting the Internal Market, COM(2021) 223 final (May 5,
2021)
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/overview/proposal_for_regulation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B3TN-DE53].
142. European Commission Press Release, Commission Proposes New Regulation to
Address Distortions Caused by Foreign Subsidies in the Single Market, IP/21/1982 (May
5,
2021)
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_1982
[https://perma.cc/KAE7-PGJJ].
143. García-Herrero, supra note 105 (claiming that in current times “European
countries will find it much harder to profit from this deal”, and that the EU “has concluded
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for relatively modest concessions.144 While most of the
agreement’s gains have already been secured through WTO
commitments and/or bilateral investment agreements between
China and individual EU Member States, the move could be
interpreted as an affront by the United States, who is keen to work
together with the European Union on a common China strategy. In
December 2020, then-President-elect Joe Biden’s National Security
Advisor, Jake Sullivan, retweeted a post about the CAI, saying that
the incoming Biden administration “would welcome early
consultations with our European partners on our common
concerns about China’s economic practices.”145 There are also
reservations about the message the European Union is sending out
by entering into a deal with China in the same year that the latter
is said to have “crushed the freedom of Hong Kong, intensified
oppression in Xinjiang, killed Indian troops, threatened Taiwan
and sanctioned Australia.”146 Skeptics further point out that the
commitments made by China with regard to subsidies, sustainable
development, or labor standards may be illusory if the country
does not in fact live up to its international treaty obligations.147
These criticisms might not be entirely justified. China is
currently the European Union’s largest trading partner.148 It is
therefore unsurprising that the European Union would be eager to
a deal which could soon become anachronic in the era of economic bifurcation”); Carafano,
et al., supra note 18; Jack Ewing & Steve Lee Myers, China and EU Leaders Strike Investment
TIMES
(Dec.
30,
2020)
Deal,
But
Political
Hurdles
Await,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/30/business/china-eu-investment-deal.html
[https://perma.cc/Q3UT-PQBK]; Mark Konstantinidis, The EU-China Comprehensive
Agreement on Investment: A Tale of Sound and Fury, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 9, 2021)
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-eu-china-comprehensive-agreement-on-investment-a-taleof-sound-and-fury/ [https://perma.cc/N497-GAE6] (arguing that “the CAI’s substantive
provisions do not, on their own, seem sufficient to foster a radically closer economic
relationship between the EU and China”); Gideon Rachman, Europe Has Handed China a
Strategic Victory, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/2d759671-0b1d4587-ba63-7480990f0438 [https://perma.cc/N46C-XQAB].
144. Rachman, supra note 143.
(Dec.
22,
2020),
145. Jake
Sullivan
(@jakejsullivan),
TWITTER
https://twitter.com/jakejsullivan/status/1341180109118726144?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/ALV8-Y7H3].
146. Rachman, supra note 143.
147. Id. See also Markus Krajewski, Dancing with the Dragon: The New EU-China
(Jan.
5,
2021)
Investment
Agreement,
VERVASSUNGSBLOG
https://verfassungsblog.de/dancing-with-the-dragon/ [https://perma.cc/TA3W-6BWQ].
148. China Overtakes US as EU’s Biggest Trading Partner, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2021)
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56093378 [https://perma.cc/58Y9-G4NT].
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adopt a clear set of rules to secure legal certainty for its investors
in the nation. It is worth noting that the United States was
discussing a similar investment agreement with China when the
European Union began considering the CAI.149 Bilateral
cooperation is standard practice, and need not substitute common
EU-US initiatives. Rather, the former could complement the latter,
and address the minutiae that would not be pertinent in a more
broadly construed joint action plan. While the gains may be small,
even baby steps toward widening the scope of investment,
removing the most onerous investment conditions, and making
preliminary assurances in regard to leveling the playing field for
investors, protecting the environment, or improving labor
standards, are significant. The fact that China has been open to
making commitments in these areas is an encouraging sign that,
moving forward, the government intends to address these
lingering concerns.
Regrettably, the ongoing political frictions may well be the
Achilles’ heel of the CAI. Amid a deteriorating relationship between
the parties,150 the European Parliament adopted a resolution to put
the deal on hold.151 For the time being, therefore, it is politically
untenable for the European Union to ratify the agreement, leaving
the CAI unenforceable.
IV. THE NEW CHINESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW
In light of the potentially insurmountable obstacles that
international initiatives face in nurturing cross-border investment,
appropriate national rules for FDI are necessary. Foreign investors
in China can now benefit from a fresh, more welcoming regulatory
149. See supra Section III.C.1.
150. Scilla Alecci, EU, US, Canada and UK Sanction Chinese Officials for Human Rights
Violations in Xinjiang, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Mar. 22, 2021),
https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/eu-us-canada-and-uk-sanctionchinese-officials-for-human-rights-violations-in-xinjiang/
[https://perma.cc/38MMQNUK]; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Announces Sanctions on Relevant EU Entities and Personnel (Mar. 22, 2021),
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1863106.shtml
[https://perma.cc/QYX4-7JTJ].
151. Joint Motion for a Resolution on Chinese Countersanctions on EU Entities and
PARL.
DOC.
(RSP
2644)
(2021),
MEPs
and
MPs,
EUR.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2021-0269_EN.html
[https://perma.cc/HP8L-MQ6T].
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framework thanks to China’s new Foreign Investment Law. The FIL
entered into force in a pre-COVID-19 world, on January 1, 2020.152
It is accompanied by Implementing Regulations,153 and replaces
various pieces of legislation.154 As a result, the FIL unifies the legal
framework for foreign investment—defined as “investment
activities in Mainland China conducted directly or indirectly by
natural persons, enterprises, or other organizations of foreign
countries”—as well as foreign-invested companies, or “enterprises
that, in accordance with Chinese law, are established in Mainland
China after being registered and that are wholly or partially
invested by foreign investors.”155
A. Legal Landscape Pre-FIL
Prior to the introduction of the FIL, the relevant legislation
was remarkably formalistic and challenging to navigate.156 NonChinese businesses faced strict structural, corporate governance,
and management requirements, and foreign ownership ratios of

152. FIL, supra note 7.
153. [REGULATION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (promulgated by the 74th Executive Meeting of the State
Council, Dec. 12, 2019, effective Jan. 1, 2020), translated in Regulation on the
Implementation of the Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China, SHANGHAI
MUNICIPAL
PEOPLE’S
GOVERNMENT,
https://www.shanghai.gov.cn/nw48709/20200826/0001-48709_127901.html
[https://perma.cc/7P85-X3QQ] [hereinafter IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS].
154. Three main pieces of legislation were replaced by the FIL: (中华人民共和国中
外合资经营企业法) [LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON CHINESE-FOREIGN EQUITY
JOINT VENTURES] (promulgated July 1, 1979, effective July 8, 1979, last amended Oct. 1,
2016)
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/2013
0300045777.shtml [https://perma.cc/ZDN8-QUGB]; (中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业
法) [LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON SINO-FOREIGN COOPERATIVE JOINT VENTURES]
(promulgated
Apr.
13,
1988,
last
amended
Oct.
1,
2016)
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chineselaw/200301/20030100065891.
shtml [https://perma.cc/ET7S-2AKH]; see also (中华人民共和国外资企业法) [LAW ON
WHOLLY FOREIGN-OWNED ENTERPRISES] (promulgated Apr. 12, 1986, last amended Oct. 1,
2016)
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200301/20030100062858
.html [https://perma.cc/TC2S-FKHW].
155. FIL, supra note 7, art. 2.
156. For a full account of the prior legislative framework, see JIANGYU WANG, COMPANY
LAW IN CHINA: REGULATION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS IN A SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY
(2014).
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national companies were capped.157 The deficiencies in the legal
framework were perceived as an obstacle to the Chinese
government’s vision of a new era of socialism with Chinese
characteristics.158 One of the pillars of the plan, known as the Four
Comprehensives,159 is to build “a moderately prosperous society in
all respects,”160 an objective that could be jeopardized if foreign
capital nosedives.161 While the substantial profits that can be
reaped in Chinese markets suffice to incite foreign interest, the old
rules could certainly deter some companies and/or prevent
successful entry of others.
B. Main Changes in the New Legislation
1. General Aspects
There is no question that the new Chinese FIL aims to
facilitate inward FDI. Article 1 explicitly refers to “opening-up” to
and “actively promot[ing]” overseas investment, by protecting
investors’ rights and standardizing the relevant rules, among other
reforms.162 There is also a promise that the state will implement a
“policy of liberalizing and facilitating investment at a high level,”
guaranteeing “mechanisms for promoting investment,” and
fostering “a market environment of stability, transparency,
predictability, and fair competition.”163 The scope of application is
also wider than that of the previous laws, covering both direct and

157. For a comprehensive explanation of the previous legislative framework, see
Yawen Zheng, China’s New Foreign Investment Law and Its Contribution Towards the
Country’s Development Goals, 22 J. OF WORLD INV. & TRADE 388 (2021).
158. (习平新时代中国特色社会主义思想) [’Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’] (incorporated into the Constitution of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) in Oct. 2017).
159. China’s Xi Jinping Unveils New “Four Comprehensives” Slogan, BBC NEWS (Feb. 25,
2015)
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-31622571
[https://perma.cc/7Q2F-C8JH].
JINPING:
THE
GOVERNANCE
OF
CHINA,
160. See
generally
XI
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/xjptgoc/xjptgoc.shtml
[https://perma.cc/2FD2BVH3].
161. April A. Herlevi, China’s New Foreign Investment Law: Quick Passage After a Long
BRIEF
9
(2019),
https://jamestown.org/wpWait,
19
CHINA
content/uploads/2019/03/Read-the-03-22-2019-CB-Issue-in-PDF-1.pdf?x31108
[https://perma.cc/8TLS-L657].
162. FIL, supra note 7, art 1.
163. Id. art. 3.
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indirect investment, including the development and establishment
of foreign subsidiaries in China.164
The general principle established for the treatment of foreign
investors is that it will be “no less favorable than that afforded to
Chinese domestic investors and their investments,”165 with the
exception of the sectors included on a “negative list” in which FDI
is either explicitly prohibited or is restricted by an access
application.166 This list is updated annually, and has been
progressively shrinking.167 The FIL specifies that equal treatment
extends to state support,168 procurement processes “through fair
competition,”169 and market access.170 The Implementing
Regulations go further, calling for equity in “government funding
arrangements, land supply, tax and fee reduction and exemption,
qualification licensing, development of standards, project
applications, and human resource policies.”171 Moreover, there is
also a list of areas where investment is encouraged by granting
foreign businesses preferential treatment172 “[a]s needed for
national economic and social development.”173 Feedback from
foreign investors will be sought when developing rules affecting
their rights and obligations.174 They will be freely allowed to move
capital and profits in and out of China in any currency.175
2. Intellectual Property Protection and the Issue of Forced
Technology Transfers
Like most of China’s recently negotiated international
treaties,176 the FIL pays special attention to the protection of the IP
164. Id. art. 2.
165. Id. art. 4.
ACCESS
NEGATIVE
LIST
2020
166. Id.;
MARKET
https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/ghxwj/202012/t20201216_1252897_ext.html
[https://perma.cc/NE65-TATQ].
167. MARKET ACCESS NEGATIVE LIST 2020, supra note 155.
168. FIL, supra note 7, art 9.
169. Id., art. 16.
170. Id., art. 24.
171. IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, supra note 153, art. 6.
172. FIL, supra note 7, art. 14.
173. IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, supra note 153, art 11.
174. FIL, supra note 7, art. 10; IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, supra note 153, art. 7.
175. FIL, supra note 7, art. 21; IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, supra note 153, arts. 22
and 37.
176. See supra Section II.C.
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rights of foreign investors and tackles FTTs.177 In general terms,
there is a compromise from the State to:
strengthen the punishment for intellectual property right
infringements, continuously enhance the enforcement of
intellectual property rights, promote the establishment of a
rapid collaborative protection mechanism for intellectual
property rights, improve the diversified settlement
mechanism for intellectual property disputes, and equally
protect intellectual property rights of foreign investors and
foreign-invested enterprises.178

Under the FIL administrative bodies and their employees are
precluded from coercing FTTs,179 and pledge to punish those who
pressure foreign investors for FTTs.180 Prior to the FIL, there was
some dispute as to whether Chinese law compelled overseas
businesses to share their technology in order to invest in China.181
These reports stemmed from the 2001 Regulation on the
Administration of Import and Export Technology, which
encouraged imports of technology182 consistent with “the
protection of the economic and technological rights and interests
of China.”183 The 2001 Regulation made registration certificates
from the MOFCOM necessary for the processing of relevant
contracts “through the formalities at the authorities of foreign
exchange, banking, taxation and customs.”184
According to Weihuan Zhou, an Associate Professor at
University of New South Wales Sydney,185 these rules do not
177. FIL, supra note 7, arts 21–22; IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, supra note 153, arts.
22–23.
178. IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, supra note 153, art. 23.
179. FIL, supra note 7, art, 22; IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, supra note 153, art. 24.
180. IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, supra note 153, art. 43.
181. See supra Part I.
182. REGULATION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF IMPORT AND EXPORT TECHNOLOGIES (中华人
民共和国技术进出口管理条例) (promulgated Dec. 10, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002) art. 7.
An
English
translation
can
be
found
at
http://mg.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policy/201910/20191002904839.shtml
[https://perma.cc/UBT8-SMVW].
183. Id. art. 4.
184. Id. art 20. See also id. art. 22 (stating that when technology is imported from
abroad “the contract of import of technologies shall be reviewed or registered in
accordance with the procedure for approval of the establishment of foreign-invested
enterprises”).
185. Associate
Professor
Weihuan
Zhou,
UNSW
SYDNEY,
https://www.unsw.edu.au/staff/weihuan-zhou [https://perma.cc/DYN5-8ZBU].
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actually amount to a legal mandate to transfer technology.186
Similarly, the laws replaced by the FIL referred to the possibility of
foreign businesses using technology as a form of capital
contribution, but did formalize an obligation to transfer such
technology.187 In this light, the word “forced” does not make
economic sense, as “American and European companies do not
have to invest in China; if they choose to do so, knowing that it will
require them to share their technology, it is because they still
expect to make a profit.”188
The crux of the matter, therefore, does not appear to be a
genuine legal obligation to transfer technology. Further, it is
questionable whether de facto FTT pressure comes from the
Chinese administration. Rather, the need to form a joint venture
with a local company, or the caps on foreign ownership, would
place Chinese businesses in a privileged position to pressure
overseas investors to compete for their partnership, thus giving
them the power to require know-how access.189 This perspective
raises doubt about the effectiveness of a law that punishes
administrative bodies, rather than private firms, for forcing
investors to transfer their know-how. As a consequence, the FIL
pledge might not address the real problem. A more effective
approach would extend the prohibition of FTTs (and the relevant
punishment) to the wider Chinese business community.
3. Obligations for Foreign Investors
The facilitation of overseas investment inevitably
accompanied the implementation of a thorough scrutiny process
to alleviate potential national security concerns. Controlling FDI
through regulation is not unique to China. Around the world, the
rising tide of overseas capital has caused certain angst over
national security concerns, and many countries have introduced
legislation to scrutinize the relevant transactions. 190 In China,
186. ZHOU, supra note 15, at 136.
187. Id. at 137.
188. Gros, supra note 17.
189. See Alan O. Skyes, The Law and Economics of “Forced” Technology Transfer and
Its Implications for Trade and Investment Policy, 13 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 127 (2021). See also
ZHOU, supra note 15, at 137 (noting that technology transfers could be “an outcome of
private negotiations between [joint venture] parties”).
190. European Commission Regulation 2019/452, supra note 42.
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Article 32 of the FIL mentions possible inspections “by the relevant
competent departments.”191 Article 35 refers to establishing a
review system for an investment that might pose such a threat,192
while Article 34 imposes an obligation to provide investment
information to the authorities.193
In January 2021, new Foreign Investment Security Review
Measures came into effect,194 fleshing out the review system
mentioned in Article 35 of the FIL.195 The measures contain an
obligation to proactively report investment in certain sectors,
including arms, agriculture, and energy.196 If the parties fail to
comply, they may be compelled to do so by a given deadline, after
which the State may order the disposal of the equity interest or
assets acquired, or reverse the transaction altogether.197 Filings for
national security review are to be scrutinized by a Working Office
with members of the National Development and Reform
Commission (“NDRC”) and the MOFCOM.198 Three stages of review
are contemplated: first, a fifteen business day deadline to decide
whether a review will be conducted;199 second, if required, a
general review of an additional thirty days;200 third, if the
investment has not been approved by the end of this period, then
an in-depth review lasting up to sixty business days (with the
possibility of extension) may take place.201
If FDI occurs in a prohibited industry, or the parties fail to
comply with the relevant legal requirements, the authorities may
191.
192.
193.
194.

FIL, supra note 7, art 32.
FIL, supra note 7, art 35.
FIL, supra note 7, art 34.
(外商投资安全审查办法) [MEASURES FOR THE SECURITY REVIEW OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENTS] (promulgated by the National Development and Reform Commission and the
Ministry
of
Commerce,
Dec.
27,
2020,
effective
Jan.
18,
2021)
https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/fzggwl/202012/P020201219582032130362.pdf
[https://perma.cc/87H2-PMTJ], translated in Measures for Security Review of Foreign
Investments, BAKER & MCKENZIE (2020) https://www.bakermckenzie.com//media/files/insight/publications/2021/01/foreign_investment_security_review_measu
res.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/E959-EATK] [hereinafter MEASURES FOR SECURITY
REVIEW].
195. FIL, supra note 7, art 35.
196. MEASURES FOR SECURITY REVIEW, supra note 194, art. 4.
197. Id. art. 16.
198. Id. art. 3.
199. Id. art. 7.
200. Id. art. 8.
201. Id. art. 9.
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additionally sanction the foreign companies under the FIL and
other laws.202 Under the new legislation, overseas investors are
subject to the same legislation as domestic firms, meaning they
have all the rights and obligations recognized in the Chinese legal
system.203
V. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT: ASPIRATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND
WIDER IMPLICATIONS
Having explored the most relevant angles of the current legal
framework for FDI in China, the task here is to critically discuss the
new developments and their repercussions. It should be noted
that, based on the findings put forward in Part I, there does not
seem to be sufficient evidence to support the claim that the merger
review process established in the AML is employed as a tool to
exert control over incoming FDI.204 Therefore, the commentary
focuses on international law developments and the FIL.
Following the 2019 reforms, China now possesses a better
structured, more comprehensive set of rules for incoming FDI,
resembling those of other WTO members.205 As outlined above, the
new regime is grounded upon three pillars: greater investment
possibilities, increased legal protection for investors, and rigorous
scrutiny of national security concerns.206 Still, questions remain as
to how supervisory powers will be exercised in practice, how the
inspections mentioned in Article 32 of the FIL might be
implemented, and how and when to apply for permission to invest
in sectors still requiring prior approval.207 Moreover, the rules do
little to clarify the division of competences and cooperation
requirements between the various bodies involved in FDI
screening.208
The concern that these improvements might be undermined
if inadequately implemented looms large. Commentators have
expressed concerns that, given the unilateral nature of the FIL, it

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

FIL, supra note 7, arts. 36-39.
FIL, supra note 7, arts. 31-33.
See supra Part I.
See supra Section III.A-B.
See supra Part III.
See Zheng, supra note 157, at 410–13.
Id. at 416–17.
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could potentially “be revoked at the stroke of a pen.”209
Additionally, the law refers to the “healthy development of the
socialist market economy” among its objectives,210 raising doubts
as to how this provision might be interpreted when enforcers
chisel out the specifics of the revamped approach. However, this
wariness may be misguided. There is little reason to doubt the
government’s genuine intention to facilitate FDI. The amendments
are not altruistic. As a developing country,211 China’s leadership is
acutely aware that amassing capital is fundamental to ensure
economic growth, and studies suggest that incoming FDI has had a
favorable effect on the Chinese economy.212 In this context,
complicating the path to investment runs counter to China’s own
interests. The new rules only further attempt to boost the positive
effects of FDI for the country. For example, the list of industries in
which investment is not only allowed but even encouraged can be
seen as an attempt to channel foreign capital into “state-defined
priorities.”213
The condemnation of FTTs in the new legislation is a
particularly welcome development, through which China can
convey to investors that it is aware of their concerns and intends
209. Dadush & Sapir, supra note 90.
210. FIL, supra note 7, art. 1.
211. Despite being one of the largest economies in the world, China is listed as a
developing country in the context of the WTO (a classification accepted by Beijing), based
on its Human Development Index (HDI) and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The
WTO’s
definition
of
developing
countries
can
be
found
at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm [https://perma.cc/JD2GKJDP].
212. See Foreign Direct Investment—The China Story, THE WORLD BANK (Jul. 16, 2020)
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2010/07/16/foreign-direct-investmentchina-story [https://perma.cc/3VTZ-HPUC]; Zheng, supra note 157 (pointing out that “at
least 40% of China’s total import and export value and an average of about 18% of national
tax revenue are contributed by foreign-invested enterprises each year”); Justin Yifu Lin &
Jun Zhang, China: Learning to Catch Up in a Globalized World, in HOW NATIONS LEARN:
TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING, INDUSTRIAL POLICY, AND CATCH-UP (Arkebe Oqubay & Kenich Ohno
eds., 2019); Sajid Anwar & Sizhong Sun, FDI and Market Entry/Exit: Evidence from China,
23 J. OF ASIAN ECON. 487 (2012); Shujie Yao, On Economic Growth, FDI and Exports in China,
38 APPLIED ECONOMICS, 339 (2006); see also Albert G.Z. Hu & Gary H. Jefferson, FDI Impact
and Spillover: Evidence from China’s Electronic and Textile Industries, 25 WORLD ECONOMY
1063 (2002). This is an older empirical study suggesting that while short-term benefits
would be absent, in the long term they would indeed materialize. But see Min Ye, Policy
Learning or Diffusion: How China Opened to Foreign Direct Investment, 9 J. OF EAST ASIAN
STUDIES 399 (2009).
213. ATUL KOHLI, STATE-DIRECTED DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL POWER AND
INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE GLOBAL PERIPHERY (2004), at 382.
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to act. It is also a clear nod to the WTO that it is complying with its
membership commitments.214 Nonetheless, the pressure local
companies might exert on potential investors to be granted access
to their technology remains unaddressed. Since technology
transfer “remains fundamental for China’s transformation to an
innovative economy,”215 the legislature appears to have been
reluctant to completely outlaw a practice that is ultimately
beneficial for the country. Crucially, the practice may be waning.
China’s expenditure in research and development has grown
exponentially over the course of this century: it has already
overtaken the European Union and is currently on the heels of the
United States.216 According to a 2020 survey of US companies
operating in China, only thirteen percent of those surveyed had
been asked to transfer their technology when negotiating with
local firms.217
Recently, doubts have been cast regarding China’s FDI
openness moving forward. In May 2020, President Xi Jinping
announced plans to adopt a “dual circulation” strategy.218 The
move, conceived amid a deteriorating relationship with the United
States, aims to bolster the national economy, without closing the
country off from the rest of the world. In this context, it is expected
that in the coming years China “will focus more on building a
stronger domestic market and pay[] more attention to quality and
efficiency instead of extensive expansion in attracting foreign
capital, or making investments in other countries.”219 At this point
in time, the potential impact of dual circulation on FDI is unclear.
So far, most of the efforts appear to be devoted to targeting
inequality in an effort to increase consumption, focusing
214. See supra Section II.B.
215. ZHOU, supra note 15, at 138.
216. Beethika Khan et al., The State of US Science and Engineering 2020, NATIONAL
SCIENCE
BOARD
(Jan.
2020),
https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20201
[https://perma.cc/7XVG-QHQB].
217. See US–CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, supra note 13.
218. China’s “Dual-Circulation” Strategy Means Relying Less on Foreigners, ECONOMIST
(Nov.
5,
2020),
https://www.economist.com/china/2020/11/05/chinas-dualcirculation-strategy-means-relying-less-on-foreigners [https://perma.cc/T4U7-P577];
Kevin Yao, What We Know About China’s “Dual Circulation” Strategy, REUTERS (Sep. 15,
2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/china-economy-transformation-explaineridUSKBN2600B5 [https://perma.cc/673C-UYN7].
219. Jing Fang et al., On the Global COVID-19 Pandemic and China’s FDI, 74 J. OF ASIAN
ECON. 1, 2 (2021).
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production on internal demand rather than exports, and achieving
technological independence by investing in innovation.220 In light
of these efforts, it appears that the trend to remove rather than
erect barriers to foreign investment is not immediately threatened.
One clear way to address the doubts regarding adequate
implementation due to the unilateral nature of the FIL would be to
get China to commit via international agreements, through the
assumption of reciprocal obligations. Yet, in the current climate,
this is an unlikely prospect. Despite the efforts of the past years,
the European Union and the United States have prioritized taking
a stance against China’s controversial handling of internal and
external affairs over the protection of their investors. From this
perspective, the FIL can be interpreted as an attempt by China to
fill gaps left by the breakdown in international negotiations to
ensure FDI continues to flow into the country, and to demonstrate
that it will not be intimidated by the failure of negotiations. IIAs are
no longer as urgent as they were relevant prior to the amendments
introduced by the FIL, even though the former may offer superior
compliance guarantees, and the latter squanders the opportunity
to exert pressure on China to accept international environmental
and labor commitments.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a post COVID-19 world, China’s leading position in the FDI
ranking looks set to remain unchallenged. China’s economy has
been less battered than others, and it has managed to maintain a
“large-scale domestic market, medium to high level per capita
wealth as well as long and complete industrial and supply
chains.”221 The commitment to curb inequality, if adequately
implemented, would mean a larger middle class with increased
purchasing power, and even more profitable markets.
Furthermore, the country has gone to great lengths to remove
regulatory constraints to investment by reforming its national

220. Frank Tang, What Is China’s Dual Circulation Economic Strategy and Why Is It
CHINA
MORNING
POST
(Nov.
19,
2020),
Important?,
SOUTH
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3110184/what-chinas-dualcirculation-economic-strategy-and-why-it [https://perma.cc/ZL8N-JWLS].
221. Fang et al., supra note 219, at 15.
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legislation, striking bilateral deals, and developing a merger
control policy largely consistent with international practice.
The prospect of new bilateral investment commitments
prospering is slim in light of the existing political climate. News
questioning China’s respect of human rights and individual
freedoms weighs heavily on negotiations. Meanwhile, China
decries slander and requests non-interference with its affairs,
indicating the divergence of perceptions between the nation and
the West.222 As tensions continue to escalate, there is little hope of
improvement in sight. Silvia Fernández de Marucci, Executive
Manager and Official Spokesperson of the Panama Canal Authority,
once said that China is not going to stop being China, and it is
unlikely that the government will alter its tactics to appease
critics.223 Instead, China has taken steps unilaterally to induce FDI.
The FIL attains roughly the same level of liberalization as recently
negotiated international agreements, and merger review
developments indicate that the contentious Coca-Cola/Huiyuan
decision did not mark the onset of a crusade against foreign
investment in popular national brands.
Beyond the blackletter law, mutually antagonistic perceptions
have the potential to hinder FDI prospects. Often unsubstantiated
and speculative, they may frighten investors rather than encourage
them to carefully monitor the markets they seek to enter or study
the local customs they must become familiar with. Critical
scholarship is undoubtedly fundamental, but it is most valuable
when it is as rigorous as can be in at least two respects. First, before
jumping to conclusions, scholarship should explore alternative
explanations for the developments in discussion (including those
that might not fit into conventional narratives). Second, it must
consider context-specific nuances and needs, and assess those
developments from that perspective as well as one’s own
viewpoint.
Overcoming this “noise,” thereby boosting the effectiveness of
the new legal landscape, is crucial, and requires determination
from both foreign investors and Chinese authorities. Instead of
222. China Denounces G7 After Statement on Xinjiang and Hong Kong, BBC NEWS (June
14,
2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-57466576
[https://perma.cc/9282-LY5W].
223. QuickHit: China is Not Going to Stop Being China, YOUTUBE (Aug. 10, 2020)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1sF-ji1NNQU [https://perma.cc/JZ9X-743X].
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fretting over the genuine extent of reforms, investors should focus
on adequately preparing for first time investment in China’s
markets. Simultaneously, greater transparency and consistency
from the Chinese establishment, as well as a willingness and
consideration to join international environmental and labor
agreements, would go a long way in reinforcing trust and
overturning fixed misperceptions.
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